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1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent,

:

v*

:

JACK NEIL COLONNA,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 870136

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION
This appeal is from a conviction of aggravated robbery,
a first degree felony, after a jury trial in the Third Judicial
District Court.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal

under UTAH CODE ANN. S 78-2-2(3)(h) (1987).
£1&TEM£HT^QE^ISSU£S„PEISIN1ED.QH^&E£EAL
The following issues are presented in this appeal:
1.

Was defendant entrapped as a matter of law?

2.

Did the conduct of the undercover officer violate

defendants right to due process under the federal or state
constitution?
3.

Did defendant receive effective assistance of

counsel at trial?
5XMEBENI-fiE-XiI£-CAS£
Defendant, Jack Neil Colonna, was charged with
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, under UTAH CODE ANN.
S 76-6-302(1)(a) (1978), and theft from a person under UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-6-404, -412 (1978) (R. 12-13).

After a jury trial on

only the former charge, defendant was found guilty of that

offense (R. 62) . The Court sentenced defendant to the Utah State
Prison for a term of five years to life with a consecutive term
of one year for use of a firearm, and ordered him to pay $425.00
in restitution (R. 70-71).
£T&TEM£EI_QF_F&£Ti3
Conflicting evidence was introduced at the trial of
this case.

The testimony of the State's witnesses and that of

defendant's witness, which differ significantly in certain
respects, are summarized below.
Michael Droubay, an undercover narcotics officer with
the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office and the State's chief
witness, testified on direct examination to the following facts.
On December 17, 1986 at approximately 7:30 p.m., Droubay met with
Charles Webber, a paid drug informant, at the residence of Reed
Rudy in Salt Lake County.

When Droubay arrived at the residence,

Webber told him that he had arranged to buy a quarter-pound of
marijuana from two individuals who were present.

However,

because Droubay did not have sufficient money to make the
purchase, he and Webber informed the individuals that they would
have to deal at some other time. Droubay and Webber then tried
to persuade Rudy to secure some cocaine for purchase by
telephone.
At approximately 8:00 p.m., defendant and another
individual, Manny East, arrived.

Defendant walked into the

kitchen where the group was situated and brandished a cocked .44
caliber revolver in Webber's face, saying, "How do you like this,
you mother fucker?"

Defendant then walked around the table,
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pointed the gun at Rudyfs face, and said "something about not
snitching [them] off to the West Valley cops anymore/

This

activity caused Droubay to discreetly draw his own revolver which
was concealed in the back of his pants, but he refrained from
using it at that time (R. 106-07, 109-11, 113-21) •
Shortly thereafter, East entered the kitchen.

In

response to East's inquiry about why they were there, Droubay and
Webber indicated that they were looking for some cocaine.

At

this time, everyone, including defendant and East, were drinking
beer.

Defendant appeared to have been drinking prior to his

arrival.

After East contacted someone by telephone about

cocaine, he, defendant, and Droubay left Rudy's residence and,
with Droubay driving, went in Droubay's vehicle to a convenience
store where, at East's request, Droubay bought a twelve-pack of
beer.

Upon leaving the store and driving towards the location

where cocaine was to be purchased, the group was pulled over by
police officers.

Droubay, who drove throughout the evening,

surreptitiously identified himself to the officers who, pursuant
to Droubay's request, "rousted" him and issued him a citation.
At the conclusion of this incident, defendant asked Droubay
whether he was a police officer, to which Droubay responded in
the negative (R. 128-32).
Once the group reached their destination, Droubay gave
East money for the purchase of cocaine.

East exited the vehicle

and entered the residence; defendant and Droubay remained behind.
In Droubay's opinion, defendant, who had been constantly drinking
beer, exhibited "escalated" behavior at this point.

East

returned with the cocaine and ingested some with defendant and
Droubayf Droubay only simulating ingestion of the substance.
Defendant's behavior continued to "escalate,"

They then drove

back to Rudy's residence where, after again making contact with
Rudy and Webber, more cocaine was ingested by defendant, East and
the others, Droubay again simulated ingestion of the substance.
East then began talking about persons who had apparently "ripped
off" part of his drug distribution territory and approached
Droubay on the subject.

Defendant "parroted" East's complaints

about the person who had allegedly wronged him (R. 132-43)•
At approximately 10:00 p.m.f Droubay, defendant, East,
and Webber left the Rudy residence in Droubay's vehicle. After
Webber was dropped off at his home, East and defendant again
talked about the person who had "ripped them off" and for the
first time identified that person as Craig Britton.

At Droubay's

suggestion, the three drove to a bar for a beer, Droubay hoping
to get to a phone to alert someone about the situation.
they consumed a pitcher of beer before leaving.

There,

Droubay was

unable to make a phone call, but East contacted Britton and
arranged a meeting for that night.

Defendant was sufficiently

"wound up" by this time that he seemingly ignored Droubay's
requests to calm down.

Although neither East nor defendant had

explained in detail how they (or East) had been "ripped off" by
Britton, East appeared bent on resolving his dispute with
Britton.

Once back in his car with defendant and East, Droubay

believed he had three options:

(1) identify himself as a police

officer and take the situation from there; (2) attempt to remove
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himself from the situation in any way possible; or (3) remain
with defendant and East and maintain the situation to the best of
his ability.

Droubay chose the third option and at East's

direction began driving toward Brittonfs residence (R. 145-52).
Upon arrival at Brittonfs residence. East and
defendant, whose behavior had continued to "escalate," quickly
exited the vehicle.

Defendant had placed the .44 calibre

revolver displayed earlier that evening in his belt. Defendant,
East, and Droubay then entered the residence, and defendant began
yelling loudly for Britton.

Droubay observed Britton in the

kitchen with East and defendant, East questioning Britton about
the location of his "dope" and money.

Defendant pointed his

cocked revolver at Britton and "screamed at him about how they
had been friends for a long time, and why would [Britton] do this
to him and do this to [East]."

Apparently informed as to the

location of either drugs or money by something Britton said, East
left the room.

Because defendant continued to point his gun at

Britton and Droubay was uncertain whether defendant would
actually fire a shot, Droubay discreetly drew his own revolver
and held it where defendant could not see it.

East then returned

with a revolver and an ammunition belt which he threw on the
table.

After returning his gun to the back of his pants, Droubay

obtained the revolver from East, unloaded it, and threw it down a
set of stairs.

Subsequently, defendant, East, Britton, and

Droubay entered Britton's bedroom, where Britton removed a small

quantity of marijuana from a dresser and handed it to East.
Once all four had returned to the kitchen, Droubay was handed a
man's wallet which when opened revealed some money that East
immediately took.

Apparently in reference to the problem

concerning the drug territory, defendant told Britton, "Don't
ever fuck us over again."

Britton and defendant, who continued

to point his gun at Britton, became agitated with each other,
causing Droubay to ask both to settle down. When Britton and
defendant both stood up, Droubay stepped between them, pushed
down the barrel of defendant's gun, pushed Britton back into a
chair, slapped him across the face, and told him that he had
"better listen to what these people had to say."

However,

defendant began shouting again, causing Droubay to pick up a
black leather jacket he had seen on a chair, walk over to
defendant, tell him to sit down, and ask him to look at the
jacket.

Defendant picked up the jacket, said, "This will fit

me," and then placed it in on a nearby table.

This seemed to

calm the situation, until Britton started to speak to defendant.
Droubay grabbed Britton's hand, applied pressure to his fingers
in a hold commonly used by police officers on patrol, and again
requested that he sit down, be quiet, and listen to what
defendant and East had to say.

Britton complied.

Shortly

thereafter, defendant, East, and Droubay left Britton's
1 Droubay's initial testimony on this matter was not entirely
clear on who removed the marijuana from the dresser or to whom it
was given (R. 162). However, at one point when referring to the
marijuana, Droubay stated, "I think [Britton] was the one that
[sic] pulled it out [of the dresser] and handed it to Mr. East"
(R. 169) .

residence, taking with them the money, the marijuana, and the
revolver Droubay had thrown down the stairs (East, who had
retrieved the weapon, apparently had all the items in his
possession) (R. 153-70).
At approximately 1:30 a.m., defendant, East, and
Droubay divided up the property taken from Britton.

As his

share, Droubay received about two and three-quarters ounces of
marijuana and one hundred dollars in cash, which were later
turned over to an evidence officer.

Droubay then drove defendant

and East to the Rudy residence, left them there, and had no
further contact with them that evening (R. 172-74) •
On cross-examination of Droubay, the following evidence
was developed.

Droubay knew that there was a good chance that

defendant and East would show up at the Rudy residence the night
of the incident.

He decided to remain with defendant and East

because he suspected that something like what eventually occurred
with Britton might happen, and he thought it would be better to
be present if such an incident were to occur.

Consistent with

the department policy that alcohol but not controlled substances
could :be ingested by an officer on duty for vice or narcotics,
Droubay had consumed approximately three beers during the
evening.

He recalled striking Britton twice or less, but denied

ever threatening to cut off Britton's fingers.

Finally, Droubay

admitted that he provided defendant and East with beer, the money
and opportunity to consume cocaine, and transportation to all
locations visited by the three of them that night (R. 235-37,
245, 251, 255, 257).
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Craig Britton, a witness for the State, testified to
the following facts. On the evening of December 17, 1986, East,
who had previously lived with Britton, called him and asked if he
and defendant could come to Britton's residence to get some
marijuana.

Britton indicated that that was all right.

Sometime

thereafter, East, defendant, and Droubay were in his house and
awakened him.

Generally, the events that followed were as

described by Droubay; however, Britton recalled that during the
incident, Droubay struck him approximately five times, threatened
to cut off his fingers, took the money out of his wallet, told
defendant to take his jacket, and wanted to take his rifle but
did not due to defendant's protest.

Britton was most afraid of

Droubay who, as did defendant and East, appeared to have been
drinking and to be "messed up."

Before he left Britton's house,

defendant shook Britton's hand and apologized for the situation.
Finally, Britton did not authorize the taking of his gun,
marijuana, or money (R. 182-83, 187-88, 190, 192, 196-97, 199,
203) .
Kendra Herlynn, a narcotics officer with the Salt Lake
County Sheriff's Office and a witness for the State, testified
that when she talked with Droubay at approximately 1:30 p.m. the
afternoon after the incident, Droubay was "notably irrational"
and "emotionally distraught."

When she met with Droubay about an

hour later, he was gray and nauseous, sweating profusely,
shaking, pacing, and had a cracking voice.

It was Herlynn's

opinion that Droubay had been drinking beers, but had not
ingested any other intoxicant, and that his condition was
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attributable to the trauma of the incident the night before. She
stated that there was no internal department policy prohibiting
the consumption of alcohol by an officer during an undercover
operation (R. 207-09, 225-27, 229).
Defendant's only witness, Reed Rudy, who had known
defendant since childhood, testified that when defendant came
into his house with a gun, "he was just playing around with
everybody," and when he pointed the gun at Webber, defendant only
said, "How do you like the barrel on this?"

Rudy, who admitted

that he was "always drinking beer," claimed that on the night in
question Droubay arrived at the residence with beer and drank it
there, smoked marijuana that he had with him, drew lines of
cocaine for everyone, and ingested cocaine (R. 265-69).
SUMMA£X_QF_££SUMENT
Under the pertinent statutory provision and the
relevant case law, defendant was not entrapped as a matter of
law.
Defendant's due process claim was not preserved for
review.

Even if the Court were to address the issue, defendant

is not entitled to a reversal of his conviction.

The undercover

officer's conduct was not so outrageous as to violate defendant's
right to due process.
Defendant received effective assistance of counsel at
trial.
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ABGUMEHT

DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A REVERSAL OF
HIS CONVICTION ON THE BASIS OF ENTRAPMENT.
Defendant argues that he is entitled to a reversal of
his conviction because the undercover officer, Droubay, entrapped
him as a matter of law.

This claim lacks merit.

UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-2-303(1) (1978) provides:
It is a defense that the actor was
entrapped into committing the offense.
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement
officer or a person directed by or acting in
cooperation with the officer induces the
commission of an offense in order to obtain
evidence of the commission for prosecution by
methods creating a substantial risk that the
offense would be committed by one not
otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely
affording a person an opportunity to commit
an offense does not constitute entrapment.
It embodies the objective standard for determining entrapment.
StaiS-Yx-EiicJssSD, 722 P.2d 756, 758 (Utah 1986) (citing £iai£_JU
Xaxlfilr 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979)).

"This standard focuses solely

on the fairness of police conduct (as opposed to the
predisposition of a defendant to commit a crime)."

Ikisl. £££

al&Q Sifl££_iU_Iid£lI r 728 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1986).
The jury rejected defendant's defense of entrapment and
found him guilty of the charged offense.

In reviewing that

decision, this Court views the evidence in a light most favorable
to the verdict. MfiUf 728 P.2d at 133; SJtfli£«XA.M5tJtiD# 713
P«2d 60, 61 (Utah 1986).

Accordingly, defendant's recitation of

the facts, which in a number of respects refers only to the
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evidence most favorable to him,^ does not provide compelling
support for his entrapment claim.

Although Droubay may have been

guilty of poor judgment in supplying defendant with alcohol and
cocaine (in view of defendant's "escalated" behavior) , providing
transportation to defendant and East, and participating in the
robbery to the extent that he did, none of his conduct indu££jl
defendant to commit the crime by "creating a substantial risk
that the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to
commit it."

Nothing in the record suggests that defendant would

not have participated in the robbery had it not been for the beer
and cocaine given him by Droubay.

And, the purchase of alcohol

and drugs, and sharing them with suspected drug traffickers, are
not unreasonable police conduct in an undercover operation, the
purpose of which is to infiltrate a drug distribution network.

1

For example, defendant states as fact that Droubay "brought
marijuana to the Reed [sic] house," that "[h]e hit Mr. Britton
three or four times in the back of the head and twice on the
nose," and that "hie] pulled Mr. Britton's fingers apart and
threatened to cut one off." Br. of App. at 15, 19. Indeed, Reed
Rudy testified that Droubay arrived at his house with marijuana,
and Craig Britton testified that the latter incidents occurred;
however, Droubay testified under oath that he did not have any
controlled substances in his possession when he first arrived at
the Rudy residence (R. 123), that he hit Britton twice or less
that evening (R. 255), and that he never threatened to cut off
Britton's fingers (R. 255). Similarly, defendant's factual
conclusion that Droubay ingested cocaine because he could not
possibly have simulated the ingestion of that substance in the
manner described is nothing more than a personal opinion based on
his assessment of contradictory testimony and the inferences he
chooses to draw therefrom.
Contrary to the implication in defendant's entrapment
argument, the jury simply was not obligated to believe the
testimony most favorable to defendant and reject contradictory
testimony favorable to the State. £££ State v. Underwood, 737
P.2d 995, 996 (Utah 1987); State v. Collier, 736 P.2d 231, 234
(Utah 1987).

Those tactics may be reasonably necessary to gain the confidence
of the investigations targets,3 and therefore# under the
circumstances, did not "fall[ ] below standards, to which common
feelings respond, for the proper use of governmental power•"
StflJtfi^Yji^Taylfil 9 599 P.2d at 500. Nor does the evidence, when
viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, demonstrate that
Droubay either manufactured the crime or actively encouraged
defendant to commit the crime; rather, defendant acted at East's
behest, not Droubay's.
Droubay*

And, East was in no way directed by

For the most part, Droubay's conduct merely afforded

defendant an opportunity to commit the offense, a circumstance
that does not constitute entrapment.

S 76-2-303(1)•

Although Droubay1s participation in the robbery was
questionable, it did not amount to an inducement under the
circumstances; there appeared to be no substantial causal
connection between his conduct and defendant's commission of the
crime.

Indeed, from Droubayfs testimony, it seems clear that

much of what he did was intended to prevent (and may well have
prevented) any physical harm to either Britton (the robbery
victim) or defendant.

Furthermore, Droubay's act of remaining

with defendant and East throughout the evening did not constitute
unacceptable police conduct.

In general, it is a socially

3

£££ Hampton v. United States, 426 U.S. 484 (1976) (where the
Supreme Court affirmed a conviction when the defendant contended
that a government informant had supplied heroin so that the
defendant could sell it to government agents); id. at 491-92
(Powell, J., concurring) (recognizing that the practicalities of
law enforcement sometimes compel officers to provide supplies to
drug manufacturing operations or even to supply "contraband
itself").

•12-

justifiable policy to allow an undercover officer, who finds
himself or herself in the presence of persons who are about to
commit a crime which is completely of their own design, to remain
with those persons throughout the commission of the crime, and
even participate in the criminal activity to whatever limited
extent is necessary to protect his or her cover, in order to
gather evidence against the offending individuals.

One could

hardly argue that this would not be an effective means of
combating crime with no intrusion on a protected right of the
offenders.*
In short,
the evidence, when viewed in a light most
favorable to the jury's verdict, does not
support the conclusion that the methods used
by [Droubay] created a substantial risk that
the offense would be committed by one not
otherwise ready to commit it. None of the
personalized high-pressure tactics or appeals
to extreme vulnerability present in recent
entrapment cases before this Court existed in
this case. £>£g SiaJt£.yA-Ciipps, Utah 692,
P.2d 747 (1984); £iaifi_Y.±_.Spi33il£ r Utah, 680
P.2d 404 (1984); Siaifi-V^Isylfll# Utah, 599
P.2d 496 (1979) .
Stflifi^Yx-MfltJtint 713 P.2d at 62.

Defendant's opinions as to what

Droubay could have done differently, although perhaps well-taken,
* That the crime of which defendant was ultimately convicted did
not directly involve the distribution of controlled substances is
not critical* Contrary to defendant's suggestion, public policy
does not demand that an officer who, like Droubay, is engaged in
an undercover drug operation be limited to ferreting out drug
offenses only and thus prohibited from investigating other
criminal activity that may present itself during that operation.
An officer should be free to investigate any criminal activity,
regardless of that officer's particular assignment. If
defendant's position were accepted, society's interest in
effective and legitimate law enforcement would be seriously
compromised.

do not change the analysis.

And, his theory that the robbery

would not have occurred without Droubay's involvement, beyond
being sheer speculation, is not really pertinent.

The point is

the robbery occurred, and the only question is whether defendant
was entrapped.

Under the relevant legal standards, he was not.

Finally, defendant's discussion of the possible
application of S 76-2-303(2) to his case need not be considered
by the Court.

Because the State never asserted that section as a

bar to defendant's entrapment defense in the trial court, and
indeed itself requested an instruction on entrapment (Plaintiff's
Requested Jury Instruction No.

(R. 32-33)), the issue

concerning the applicability of § 76-2-303(2) should not be
addressed.
P.2d

,

Cf • S±fii£_yjL_Jisl>2Pr 7 5 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 3 4-35,
(1988) (because prosecutor, defense counsel, and

trial court proceeded under 1983 version of statute, although
1984 statute was perhaps technically applicable to trial
procedures, State could not assert on appeal that 1984 statute
controlled case).
PQIN1-IJ
THE UNDERCOVER OFFICER'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE
ROBBERY WAS NOT SO OUTRAGEOUS AS TO VIOLATE
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
As an alternative to his entrapment claim, defendant
argues that his conviction should be reversed because the
undercover officer's involvement in the robbery was so outrageous
that it denied defendant due process of law under the federal
and/or state constitutions.

Because this issue is raised for the

first time on appeal, it should not be considered. jSiaifi-Xx
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SifiSSSllr 660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983).

Even if the Court

addresses the question, although some of defendant's criticisms
of Droubay's participation in the crime are justified, reversal
of his conviction is not warranted.
In UDii£d_Si3i§s_y.L_Rugs£ll, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32,
(1973), the United States Supreme Court recognized that there may
be "situationls] in which the conduct of law enforcement agents
is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar
the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a
conviction."

Although a plurality of the Court in H^mpi2D»Yx

J2fli.t£d_£.tflJt£S f 425 U.S. 484 (1976) , concluded that the outrageous
conduct defense was not available to a defendant who was
predisposed to commit the crime, i<J. at 490, a majority of the
Court rejected this view and recognized that the defense was
available under certain circumstances irrespective of the
defendant's predisposition, i$2. at 495 n.7 (Powell, J.,
concurring, joined by Blackmun, J#); i&.

at 497 (Brennan, J.,

dissenting, joined by Stewart and Marshall, J.J.)*

In the

federal system, the outrageous conduct defense is a separate and
alternative defense to entrapment—the entrapment defense being
available only to a defendant who does not have a predisposition
to commit the crime. 5

In those jurisdictions that have adopted

5 Although there has been a lively debate on the issue of whether
the objective or subjective standard for entrapment should be
adopted in the federal courts, £&£ United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. 423, 439-50 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Hampton v.
United States, 425 U.S. 484, 495-500 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting), the Supreme Court has adopted the subjective
approach, Bufififill, 411 U.S. at 433.

t h e o b j e c t i v e approach t o e n t r a p m e n t , such a s U t a h , t h e
o u t r a g e o u s c o n d u c t d e f e n s e i s e s s e n t i a l l y an e x t e n s i o n of t h e
t r a d i t i o n a l entrapment d e f e n s e which f o c u s e s "on whether t h e
p o l i c e conduct r e v e a l e d in the p a r t i c u l a r case f a l l s

below

s t a n d a r d s , t o which common f e e l i n g s r e s p o n d , f o r t h e proper u s e
of g o v e r n m e n t a l power."
fllSfi

£iai£_yA_layl£It

599 P.2d a t 5 0 0 .

BdfflPJtfiD.v^^yDiJtSd-SiaifiJB # 425 U . S . a t 496-97

dissenting).

£££

(Brennan,

J.,

In £ £ a i £ _ i L i _ F i i £ £ l , 744 F.2d 1 3 6 6 , 1369 (Utah 1 9 8 7 ) ,

t h i s Court i n dictum c i t e d Rygfifill and r e c o g n i z e d t h a t under
c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s o u t r a g e o u s p o l i c e c o n d u c t may c o n s t i t u t e a
due p r o c e s s v i o l a t i o n .

Although t h i s Court has n o t e l a b o r a t e d on

t h i s p r i n c i p l e , most f e d e r a l c o u r t s have s t a t e d t h a t "the due
p r o c e s s c h a n n e l which BuSSfill kept open i s a most narrow o n e , "
UDii£d_££a££S_Y.i_£££Qb£ig#

803 F.2d 4 2 2 , 429 ( 9 t h C i r . 1986)

( q u o t i n g UDiJt£d_£iaJt£_Yj._£i!ai}r 548 F.2d 7 8 2 , 789 ( 9 t h C i r . ) ,
£ £ ! £ • d£Di£d# 429 U . S . 939 ( 1 9 7 6 ) , and 430 U . S . 965 ( 1 9 7 7 ) ) , and
"a due p r o c e s s v i o l a t i o n w i l l be found o n l y in t h e r a r e s t and
most o u t r a g e o u s c i r c u m s t a n c e s , " U D i £ e 3 _ £ i a £ £ S _ v ^ & t ^ a g a §

807

F.2d 4 2 4 , 426 ( 5 t h C i r . 1986) ( f o o t n o t e c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) .
SlSfl

flni*Sd-S£flJfceS-X*_SbfiffMI#

Sfi£

826 F.2d 6 1 9 , 626 ( 7 t h C i r . ) ,

Cfilix 3£Di£i3# 108 S. C t . 356 ( 1 9 8 7 ) ; Unii£3_£Jtai£S_i*_i?a£i3 # 793
F.2d 5 5 1 , 554 (3d C i r . 1 9 8 6 ) .
A common theme running through the case law in this
area is that a due process violation will not be found unless
there are both government over involvement in the charged crime
and a relatively passive role by the defendant.
F*2d at 427.

Alifiaair 807

Where there is significant independent involvement
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by the defendant, the criminal activity is initiated by the
defendant, or the criminal enterprise is underway before the
government agent becomes involved, a due process violation is
unlikely.

£££ UDii£<3_SJU:US_Y.i_SilDBSfiIJ# 813 F.2d 1462, 1470-71

(9th Cir.), cert* dfiflifidr 108 S. Ct. 233 (1987); Unii£s3_£:tfiJ;££_X*
MilfllDf 817 F.2d 1113, 1115-16 (4th Cir. 1987); Ward, 793 F,2d at
554-55.

As noted in £i£Dk£I35
Constitutionally unacceptable conduct
includes, but is not limited to, situations .
• • where "government agents engineer and
direct the criminal enterprise from start to
finish," yBii£d_g£gtes_y-1_RM».ii:£.Z # 710 F.2d
535, 539 (9th Cir. 1983), and where the
government essentially manufacturers new
crimes in order to obtain the defendant's
conviction, s££ id. at 540; [UDli£d-SJtflJt£S
Xxl.Bfigflii, 783 F.2d [1428, 1438 (9th Cir.
1986)1.

803 F.2d at 429.

Although in some respects questionable,

particularly with regard to some of the physical and verbal
conduct he directed toward Britton, Droubayfs involvement in the
robbery, when viewed in light of the standards discussed above,
was not so outrageous as to constitute a due process violation
under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.
He merely attached himself to criminal activity clearly initiated
and directed by defendant and East.

Even though some of what

Droubay did is not to be condoned, the courts should be reluctant
to exercise ••a chancellors foot1 veto over law enforcement
practices of which it [does] not approve."
BUfiflfillr 411 U.S at 435.
iteld/ 793 F.2d at 554.
y-i_Sh£i£D£i:

UDiJt£$3_SJtflJt£S-Y*

Sfi£ 3l52 £iffl£S£D# 813 F.2d at 1468;

As stated by the court in BDit£$3.5iai£S

(0]ur job is not to censure police officers
for every act of questionable conduct in
which they engage—we leave that to those
with direct responsibility for supervision of
the officers involved. Our job is to
interpret the Constitution.
Some criticism of Droubayfs conduct by the

826 F*2d at 626.

Court is probably justified, but reversal on due process grounds
is unwarranted.

What police misconduct is present "undoubtedly

arose from poor judgment rather than bad faith or malice, and it
did not breach any right of this defendant."
255 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Iowa 1977).

££aie_y-1._jPfiQi£i,

This is not a case of

manufactured crime, and therefore is distinguishable from those
cases where prosecution was barred because the government
"involveld] itself so directly and continuously over such a long
period of time in the creation and maintenance of criminal
operations" as to make prosecution "repugnant to American
criminal justice."

Sl££D£_VjL_Uni£££LS£a££St

454 F.2d 783, 787

(9th Cir# 1971) (where government agents collaborated with a
suspected criminal to establish an illegal bootlegging operation
and then sustained the operation, acting as both the supplier and
sole customer of the illegal operation it had created) . £££ jBlS2
Ufli£fid_S£fil£S_YA_Jiass r 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978) (where
government agents established and supplied a narcotics laboratory
in order to arrest a suspect who was at the time "lawfully and
peacefully minding his own affairs").

Finally, there is no

textual or public policy reason for analyzing this due process
issue differently under article I, section 7 of the Utah
Const i tut i on.

S&S Yflli_Cfinxai£S££Di_4_Cai£-lD££iJtU£ifln_X*

IndUStlifli-CflmiBiSSifiDr 649 P.2d 33, 35-36 (Utah 1982) ("This
-18-

Court has held that decisions relating to the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution are
highly persuasive when interpreting the due process clause of the
Utah Constitution.").

MIMLJJI
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A REVERSAL OF
HIS CONVICTION FOR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL AT TRIAL.
Defendant argues that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel at trial because counsel (1) "failed to
adequately prepare for trial as a result of his failure to
properly plea bargain;" (2) "failed to adequately present the
defense of entrapment;" (3) "failed to object or move for
mistrial after officer alluded to past offenses of Mr. Colonna in
direct testimony;" and (4) "fail[ed] to move to dismiss the
information based on the officer's outrageous conduct."
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel
justifying reversal of a conviction, "it is the defendant's
burden to show:

(1) that his counsel rendered a deficient

performance in some demonstrable manner; and (2) that the outcome
of the trial would probably have been different but for counsel's
error."

Sifltfi-^-Sfifliy, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985).

summarized in £iflJt£_yA_Elflm£# 723 P.2d 401 (Utah 1986):
In claiming ineffective counsel, defendant
has the burden to demonstrate that counsel's
representation falls below an objective
standard of reasonableness. C2diADB3_X*
Mollis* 6609 P.2d 1101, 1108-09 (Utah 1983).
Defendant must prove that specific,
identified acts or omissions fall outside the
wide range of professionally competent
assistance. The claim may not be
speculative, but must be a demonstrative
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As

reality, sufficient to overcome the strong
presumption that counsel rendered adequate
assistance and exercised "reasonable
professional judgment," SilielslaQd-Yx
W35l)iD3i2Ur 466 U.S 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052,
2066, 80- L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); S£s££ y A
LailkYr 699 P.2d 1187, 1204 (Utah 1984).
And, an unfavorable result does not compel a
conclusion of ineffective assistance of
counsel. £ia£g_yA_Bii£l # 700 P.2d at 703.
Furthermore, any deficiency must be
prejudicial to defendant. It is not enough
to claim that the alleged errors had some
conceivable effect on the outcome or could
have had a prejudicial effect on the fact
finders. To be found sufficiently
prejudicial, defendant must affirmatively
show that a "reasonable probability" exists
that, but for counsel's error, the result
would have been different. We have defined
"reasonable probability" as that sufficient
to undermine confidence in the reliability of
the verdict.
723 P.2d* at 405 -(footnote citation omitted).

Defendant fails to

satisfy this two-pronged standard on any of his ineffectiveness
claims.
Defendant's claim concerning the plea bargaining
process in his case is disposed of by S£aJL§_Yx_S£3iy*

There, the

Court made clear that the standards relating to ineffective
assistance of counsel do not apply to the plea bargaining
process.

It stated in this regard that "our state and federal

constitutions guarantee fair trials, not plea bargains."

707

P.2d at 646.
Defendant's argument concerning entrapment is wholly
speculative.

This is obvious from the record, where, as conceded

by defendant, the trial court specifically stated that had a
pretrial entrapment motion been filed by counsel pursuant to
§ 76-2-303(4), it would have been denied (R. 296-97).
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Furthermoref trial counsel adequately presented the entrapment
argument to the jury (R. 286-94).
And, insofar as trial counsel%s performance was
deficient for failing to object to passing references to
defendant's past offenses, reversal is not warranted*

Given the

substantial evidence of defendant's guilt, the prejudice prong of
the ineffectiveness test is not satisfied.

Defendant does not

demonstrate that the absence of the alleged deficiency "would
give rise to a reasonable likelihood of a different result."
SifliS-Yx-AlCllUleifl# 747 P.2d 1019, 1024 (Utah 1987).

The alleged

error does not "undermine confidence in the reliability of the
verdict."

flSffifir 723 P.2d at 405. Sfifi slSQ SiaJtg_.yJt_Lfliiky, 699

P.2d 1187, 1205 (Utah 1984).
Finally, in light of the discussion in Point I,
defendant fails to meet either prong of the ineffectiveness test
with respect to the alleged due process violation.

CQHCLUSIQH
Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendant's
conviction should be affirmed.

,^.

RESPECTFULLY submitted this _/f_ day of March, 1988.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

DAVID B. THOMPSON
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Assistant Attorney General
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